The Nobel Prize as a Reward Mechanism in the Genomics Era: Anonymous Researchers, Visible Managers and the Ethics of Excellence by Zwart, H.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/83933
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Bioethical Inquiry (2010) 7:299-312 
DOI 10.1007/s11673-010-9248-0
The Nobel Prize as a Reward Mechanism in the Genomics 
Era: Anonymous Researchers, Visible Managers 
and the Ethics of Excellence
Hub Zwart
Received: 29 March 2009 / Accepted: 26 May 2010/Published online: 9 July 2010 
©  The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The Human Genome Project (HGP) is 
regarded by many as one of the major scientific 
achievements in recent science history, a large-scale 
endeavour that is changing the way in which 
biomedical research is done and expected, moreover, 
to yield considerable benefit for society. Thus, since 
the completion of the human genome sequencing 
effort, a debate has emerged over the question 
whether this effort merits to be awarded a Nobel 
Prize and if so, who should be the one(s) to receive it, 
as (according to current procedures) no more than 
three individuals can be selected. In this article, the 
HGP is taken as a case study to consider the ethical 
question to what extent it is still possible, in an era of 
big science, of large-scale consortia and global team 
work, to acknowledge and reward individual contri­
butions to important breakthroughs in biomedical 
fields. Is it still viable to single out individuals for 
their decisive contributions in order to reward them in 
a fair and convincing way? Whereas the concept of
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the Nobel prize as such seems to reflect an archetyp­
ical view of scientists as solitary researchers who, at a 
certain point in their careers, make their one decisive 
discovery, this vision has proven to be problematic 
from the very outset. Already during the first decade 
of the Nobel era, Ivan Pavlov was denied the Prize 
several times before finally receiving it, on the basis 
of the argument that he had been active as a research 
manager (a designer and supervisor of research 
projects) rather than as a researcher himself. The 
question then is whether, in the case of the HGP, a 
research effort that involved the contributions of 
hundreds or even thousands of researchers worldwide, 
it is still possible to “individualise” the Prize? The “HGP 
Nobel Prize problem” is regarded as an exemplary issue 
in current research ethics, highlighting a number of 
quandaries and trends involved in contemporary life 
science research practices more broadly.
Keywords Human Genome Project. Nobel Prize ■ 
Research ethics . Fairness of reward mechanism 
in biomedical research
...the capital, invested in safe securities by my 
executors, shall constitute a fund, the interest on 
which shall be annually distributed in the form  
o f  prizes to those who, during the preceding 
year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit 
on mankind... (excerpt from Alfred N obel’s will).
We all try, but some succeed (Humphrey Bogart 
in Casablanca).
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Q u’importe qui parle? En cette indifférence 
s ’affirme le principe éthique, de plus founda- 
mental peut-être, de l ’écriture contemporaine 
(Michel Foucault 1994, 789)
Introduction: The Century of the Nobel Prize
The first Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, like 
those in Chemistry, Physics, Literature and Peace, 
was awarded in 1901. Indeed, the twentieth century 
can be regarded as the century of the Nobel Prize. 
From the very outset, however, Nobel Prizes in 
general, and the one in Physiology or Medicine in 
particular, have been plagued by what can be referred 
to as a basic tension between reality and ideal. By 
singling out individual scientists as paragons of 
scientific achievement in their fields, the Nobel Prize 
seems to endorse the “archetypical” idea of a solitary 
researcher making his or her one great discovery or 
invention, to the benefit of mankind, as it is stated in 
Alfred Nobel’s will. Although from the 1950s 
onwards Nobel Prizes in Physiology or Medicine 
have usually been awarded to three persons rather 
than one, as had been the common rule during 
the first half of the century, these three persons 
are still usually seen as individual scientific “heavy 
weights” working in a more or less independent and 
“researcher-driven” fashion, rather than as “science 
workers” firmly embedded in extended research net­
works or consortia. Whereas solitude, perseverance, 
creativity and flashing insights are bound to remain 
basic ingredients of scientific discovery, the archetypi­
cal idea of the scientific hero seems nonetheless 
increasingly at odds with the way in which research is 
actually conducted. And although (as will be pointed 
out below) this basic tension is as old as the Nobel 
Prize in Physiology or Medicine itself, it has become 
increasingly problematic as the research practices 
involved continue to expand in terms of pace, complex­
ity and scale.
This intricate issue can be addressed from various 
angles: history of science, sociology of science, 
science ethics, etc. In this contribution, I intend to 
address it from a normative perspective, as a quandary 
of contemporary science ethics, thereby regarding the 
awarding of Nobel Prizes first and foremost as a 
moral issue. The Nobel Prize is considered by many
as the acme of acknowledgement, and, as Merton and 
others have pointed out, acknowledgement (in various 
formats, ranging from citations, chairs and appoint­
ments up to international prizes) is crucially important 
in science. But as such, it is also likely to be highly 
controversial, raising a host of normative issues and 
deliberations in terms of transparency and fairness, 
both on a general level and with respect to specific 
cases. Moreover, by being awarded a Nobel Prize, the 
researchers involved are singled out as models or 
examples for others, as exemplary scientists setting a 
standard, not only in terms of the discoveries or 
inventions they actually made, but also in terms of 
crucial scientific values they came to embody such as 
disinterestedness, reliability, honesty, meticulousness 
and the like. Or, to formulate it in a negative vein: 
should a Nobel Prize winner be exposed as a 
dishonest person and a fraud, science as such would 
be in danger of seeing its credibility diminished. 
Awarding the Prize on the basis of a particular 
achievement, a groundbreaking experiment or publi­
cation, conveys the message that this is how science 
ought to be done. And this explains why the Nobel 
Prize in Physiology or Medicine has stirred such a 
plethora of normative controversies and why the 
actual decisions made seem to become increasingly 
contested over the years: the awarding of such Prizes 
involves more than counting citations or determining 
an author’s H-factor. It entails a normative statement 
concerning the value and values involved in a highly 
dynamical and rapidly evolving phenomenon called 
science. The type of considerations for selecting and 
evaluating candidates are bound to change as science 
develops over time. As “Nobel Prize historian” 
Robert Friedman phrases it, “success or failure in 
winning [the prize] has not depended upon timeless, 
fixed standards of excellence. Rather, the changing 
priorities and agendas of committee members, as well 
as their comprehension of scientific accomplishment, 
have been critical” (2001, ix).
Yet, although my paper will basically take a 
science ethics perspective, sociological and historical 
analyses are crucially important when it comes to 
providing the “input” for a normative assessment. 
Ethical considerations have to build and critically 
reflect on empirical analyses of how practices of 
knowledge production are actually evolving and how 
controversies and dilemmas concerning the Nobel 
Prize in Physiology or Medicine have actually been
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dealt with. Moreover, rather than addressing this issue 
on a general level, I will focus on a particular case 
study, namely the Human Genome Project (HGP). 
Should the sequencing of the human genome be 
awarded by the Nobel Prize and, if so, who should 
be the (one, two or three) persons to receive it? By 
focussing on this case study I intend to address in a 
concrete manner the more general question: to what 
extent can the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 
still be regarded as a fair and convincing mechanism 
of reward in an era of anonymity, global networks, 
multiple authorship, private-public partnerships and 
Big Science.
The Human Genome Project
The HGP will certainly present an interesting but also 
a difficult case for Nobel Prize committees to deal 
with. The sequencing of the human genome is 
regarded by many as one of the major scientific 
highlights in recent science history. And it may be 
seen as highly symbolic perhaps that the human 
genome sequence was published in 2001, exactly 
100 years after the first Nobel Prizes were awarded 
(International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium 
[IHGSC] 2001). Moreover, from the very outset, the 
HGP has generated a plethora of claims concerning 
the benefits for humankind that are expected to result 
from it in terms of health, sustainability and empow­
erment. Thus, from the very start, this project, the final 
conclusion as it were of a long journey that began with 
the re-discovery of Mendel in 1900 and the disclosure 
of the structure by DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953 
(Watson and Crick 1953), has raised the question 
whether a Nobel prize should be attached to it—not a 
regular one, moreover, but rather a kind of mega-Nobel 
prize, the Nobel prize of Nobel Prizes, and perhaps 
even more than just one. Indeed, a decade of Nobel 
Prizes might be expected to flow from it. The history 
of the HGP is more or less haunted by this question 
and the likelihood that some of its key protagonists 
would one day receive a phone call from Stockholm 
has been an issue of speculation and dispute on various 
occasions. Indeed, protagonists such as Craig Venter 
consciously tailored their publication policies so as to 
increase the likelihood of one day earning the biggest 
prize in science (Shreeve 2004). Moreover, the HGP is 
regarded as the “flagship project” of genomics as an
emerging technoscientific field, an endeavour claimed 
to have irreversibly and fundamentally changed the 
way in which research in the life sciences is done 
(Collins et al. 2003). Another important reason for 
focussing the discussion on the HGP is that more than 
any other recent achievement in science, it exemplifies 
the current transformations that are taking place in the 
way in which scientific knowledge is produced. The 
question basically is what these transformations—this 
“scientific revolution” that is clearly connected with 
the emergence of Big Science—imply (from a norma­
tive perspective) for the scientific individual. The idea 
of a Nobel Prize presupposes that a major scientific 
feat can still be meaningfully attributed to the talents 
and commitment of one, two or three concrete 
individuals at most. The era of Big Science, as 
exemplified by the HGP, raises the question to what 
extent this presupposition is still feasible.
Big Science
The Big Science concept builds on the scientometric 
observation, put forward by De Solla Price (1963) and 
others, that there is a tendency in modern research 
towards exponential growth, regardless of whether 
this refers to the number of researchers, author names, 
publications, journals, journal articles, citations or any 
other quantitative indicator. As all these indicators 
display the tendency to double at regular intervals, 
scientific inquiry has by now evolved into a rather 
massive phenomenon, and the archetypical image of 
the solitary researcher increasingly seems to become 
marginalised as a relic from the past. Moreover, the 
Big Science concept not only refers to the actual 
number of researchers working and collaborating 
within a particular field, but also to the increased 
dependence of current research on massive, expensive 
and sophisticated technologies, as exemplified by the 
particle collider at CERN, but also by the automated 
sequencing machines of genomics research, involving 
large-scale investments and sophisticated manage­
ment structures. Publications in particle physics in 
which CERN findings are reported may have several 
hundred authors, and biology is now moving in the 
same direction with the advent of the industrial-scale 
work required for sequencing genomes (Bishop 
2003). As the number of individuals responsible 
for single breakthroughs in scientific research has
Ö  Springer
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gradually increased, so too has the sentiment that a 
limit of three recipients for each prize may be too 
restrictive. Whereas most discoveries in modern 
science arise from the efforts of multiple individu­
als, no more than three individuals can receive the 
prize in each category. In fact, the current limit of 
three for each prize is itself a compromise, represent­
ing a revision of Nobel’s original bequest, which 
speaks of only one recipient per prize. Might the 
Nobel Foundation now be tempted to make the awards 
even more inclusive? The Nobel Foundation does 
not seem inclined to move in this direction (Bishop 
2003, 24).
In what manner does the emergence of Big Science 
undermine the credibility of policies of individual 
recognition as such? In this paper I will argue that, as 
we experience a period of increase in scale and pace, 
of globalisation o f scientific effort, individual 
researchers increasingly tend to operate in the context 
of massive knowledge networks. They have become 
anonymous rather than autonomous. Yet, this does not 
mean that the ethical dimension of individual com­
mitment is being erased altogether, quite the contrary. 
Rather, I see it as a challenge for contemporary 
science ethics to address the novel ethical problems 
and dilemmas arising in such complex, competitive 
and large-scale research environments in a convincing 
way (Zwart 2008a). This implies that, besides 
traditional values such as autonomy and perseverance 
in the face of adverse external pressures, academic 
excellence must increasingly involve other virtues and 
values as well, such as transparency, fairness and a 
communicative attitude towards the outside world. 
And the Nobel Prize, as a highly visible mechanism 
of acknowledgement in science, should reflect and 
acknowledge this. But before turning to the present, 
allow me to briefly browse through the Nobel Prize 
archives to see how this dilemma has been dealt with 
in the past.
A Century of Nobel Prizes: From Ivan Pavlov 
to the HGP
The responsibility for awarding the Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine lies with the Karolinska 
Institute in Stockholm, but the details of nomination, 
evaluation and selection are a well preserved secret 
(Feldman 2000). The statutes of the Nobel Foundation
provide for strict secrecy and minutes from Committee 
meetings are non-existent, but we may still get to know 
something every now and then (http://nobelprize.org; 
Friedman 2001). Letters of correspondence and all 
letters of nomination since 1901 are kept in the 
committee’s archive, while reports from the commit­
tee’s advisers have been printed in separate internal 
volumes for each decade. After 50 years the Director 
of the Norwegian Nobel Institute may give access to 
these archival sources, primarily for the purpose of 
historical research. In 1976, for instance, the Nobel 
Foundation opened its archives to researchers up to the 
year 1950 (Friedman 2001).
These intriguing files and sources indicate that the 
tension outlined above has been haunting Nobel Prize 
procedures from the very start, as exemplified by the 
case of the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov. In four 
successive years (1901, 1902, 1903, 1904) Pavlov 
was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Physiology 
or Medicine, and each time the award committee 
confronted the same question: to what extent were the 
products of Pavlov’s laboratory truly Pavlov’s? The 
nominee had himself pronounced that his most 
substantial work, Lectures on the Work o f  the Main 
Digestive Glands (1897), was the achievement of his 
entire laboratory. He had credited his co-workers for 
conducting the experiments on which it was based. 
Furthermore, he referred readers seeking evidence 
for his arguments to their publications. Did Pavlov’s 
major work, on which his nomination was based, 
represent his own original contributions to science, or 
was it merely a “compilation of the experimental 
dissertations?” (Todes 2002, xiii). Apparently endors­
ing the archetypical image of the scientist as a heroic 
lone investigator, the Nobel Prize Committee was 
now confronted with a more or less novel and 
apparently somewhat aberrant form of scientific 
knowledge production. Pavlov was actually a research 
manager rather than a solitary researcher, and his 
laboratory was a “factory,” producing series of 
knowledge claims in a systematic fashion, constitut­
ing something of a knowledge production line, rather 
than a small-scale “workshop.” Although Pavlov 
designed most of the trials and presented the research 
results in books, papers and lectures, the actual 
experiments were conducted by the “praktikanti” 
working in Pavlov’s research facilities, hoping to 
complete their medical education in this manner. 
Nonetheless, in 1904, the prize finally was awarded
Ô  Springer
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to him. Still, the tension between the somewhat 
romantic image of the researcher as an individual, 
about to make his one key discovery, his highly 
personal contribution to the benefit of mankind, and 
the way in which scientific knowledge claims came to 
be produced by academic professionals in the course 
of the twentieth century, is bound to increase even 
further with the emergence of big science as exem­
plified by the HGP.
Indeed, one century later, in 2000 and 2001, a similar 
dilemma presented itself, but on an even grander 
scale. On June 26 2000, President Clinton, together 
with Francis Collins (Director of the International 
Human Genome Sequencing Consortium) and Craig 
Venter (his self-proclaimed rival, representing the 
privately owned Celera Company), announced at a 
press conference that the massive effort to sequence 
the human genome was reaching its completion. In 
2001, both teams published their results in a co­
ordinated fashion, through milestone articles in Nature 
and Science respectively (IHGSC 2001, Venter et al.
2001). Collins’ version listed 249 “authors”, and 
Venter’s publication 285. These very numbers already 
indicate that Big Science as a phenomenon had 
reached the life sciences by now. As indicated above, 
CERN publications in the field of high energy physics 
already display such tendencies towards multiple 
authorship, but for the life sciences, where the bulk 
of academic research still tended to be conducted 
on the basis of individual research grants, this was 
something of a novelty. Both the press conference and 
the two key publications significantly fuelled the 
debate over the question whether this achievement 
should merit a Nobel Prize and, more complicated even, 
who should be the person or persons to receive it?
Shortly after the Nature publication, at a follow- 
up press conference in San Francisco organised 
during a meeting of the American Association fo r  
the Advancement ofScience  (AAAS) on February 18 
2001, Francis Collins was explicitly asked whether 
the sequencing of the human genome warranted the 
Nobel Prize. In his (now famous) reply he stated that 
it would have to be given to 3,492 people to properly 
recognize everyone who had significantly contributed 
to this common effort (Davies 2002, 266). This 
attitude of humility and collectivism was already 
conveyed by the opening pages of the Nature 
publication itself, where Collins was listed simply 
as one author among many, allowing his colleague
Eric Lander (who in fact had done most of the actual 
writing) to be the first name on the list. In the case of 
Venter, things were slightly different. He put his own 
name first and at various occasions explicitly 
considered the likelihood that some of his highly 
cited key publications, notably the one on the 
human genome, might bring him the Nobel Prize 
some day. Both Collins and Venter, however, have 
subsequently published memoirs containing exten­
sive reflections on their human genome years (Collins 
2006, Venter 2007) and both documents make it 
abundantly clear how problematic it would be to 
give credit for the human genome sequencing effort 
to one, two or three individuals only. Although at 
crucial moments individual initiatives, personalities 
and eureka-like experiences of enlightenment remain 
undoubtedly important, life science research in the 
genomics era as such has irrevocably grown into a 
large-scale, collective endeavour.
If a Nobel Prize is to be awarded for deciphering 
the human genome, therefore, it is difficult to see how 
this can be done in a manner that is both meaningful 
and fair. As Robert Cook-Deegan phrases it: “the 
final truth is that no individual can take full credit” 
(1995, 71). Moreover, he argues that Nobel selection 
committees are “perpetually unfair” in conferring a 
prize on “winners” in science—ignoring the way 
science has changed so that most major advances 
require the efforts of hundreds of researchers, not one 
or two (ibid.). We seem to be faced with a real dilemma. 
On the one hand, when it comes to awarding the Nobel 
Prize somewhere in the near future, the human genome 
sequencing effort seems impossible to ignore. On the 
other hand it seems equally impossible to single out 
even a limited number ofrecipients in a convincing way 
Each possible selection promises to be highly contro­
versial. It appears to be an impossible task from the 
very outset.
What does this imply for the Nobel Prize as a 
reward mechanism in science? Since Merton we are 
familiar with the idea that scientists are much more 
interested in symbolic expressions of acknowledgement 
than in more mundane forms of reimbursement such as 
money. In order to “organize” acknowledgement, 
moreover, a number of mechanisms have been put in 
place such as citation indices, invited lectures, Nature 
covers and, at the very summit of the acknowledge­
ment pyramid, the Nobel Prize. Yet, some of these 
acknowledgement mechanisms apparently stem from
Ö  Springer
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more or less outdated views on how science works. 
Nobel’s bequest, spelled out in a single handwritten 
paragraph, seems to convey the idea of solitary 
researchers who, at a certain point during their long 
journey, have this one grand idea that will not only 
further science, but will also bring significant benefits 
to society. And indeed, discoveries of this type have 
existed and will no doubt continue to exist. The 
discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and 
Crick may to a certain extent be seen in this manner, 
namely as a key discovery attributable to discrete 
individuals who embarked on a research effort of their 
own design. Although even in this case the role of co­
discoverers incited much controversy, notably the 
question of whether the role of Rosalind Franklin had 
been duly acknowledged, the consensus gradually 
seems to have emerged that, although the work of 
Chargaff, Franklin and others had been pivotally 
important, Watson and Crick were nonetheless the 
ones who, at the crucial moment, choose the right track 
and made the final decisive steps (Maddox 2002). Yet, 
the overall picture seems to be that the tension between 
the basic image to which the Nobel Prize still tends to 
adhere and the actual practices of knowledge produc­
tion as they currently evolve, continues to increase.
Mechanisms of Acknowledgement
This tension causes similar problems of course for 
other mechanisms of acknowledgement as well, such 
as citation indices (Wouters 1999, cf. Zwart 2005). Is 
the academic citation culture fair? Does it reflect the 
value of contributions in a meaningful way? Can a 
citation index be regarded as a reliable indicator when 
it comes to assessing the academic quality and impact 
of individuals or research groups? Robert Merton 
himself emphasized the lack of fairness in citation 
practices when he described what he referred to as the 
Matthew effect in science (Merton 1988, cf. Zwart 
2005, 78). This concept builds on a famous saying 
borrowed from the Gospels: “For unto everyone that 
hath shall be given, and he shall have in abundance; 
but from him that hath not shall be taken away even 
what he hath” (Mt 13:12). In contemporary language: 
those of us who “have” are bound to receive even 
more, while the have-nots will become even more 
deprived. In terms of citation indices this means that 
most articles published by scientists will be cited
only a few times, and then they will be forgotten 
completely, as if they had never been written. Indeed, 
most authors will be read and cited by only a limited 
number of readers, and eventually they will be ignored 
more or less for ever. Some articles, however, will be 
cited more often and the number of citations may even 
reach a certain critical limit. Beyond that point, the 
number of citations is bound to increase dramatically 
and exponentially. These publications will receive 
hundreds or even thousands of citations. Colleagues 
will continue to cite them for 20 or 30 years, until the 
paradigm to which the publication belongs expires. 
Thus, a limited number of authors may publish articles 
that really allow them to make their name, although 
the time and effort spent on writing them may not 
significantly exceed the amount of time and effort spent 
on publications that are treated less respectfully.
Various factors may contribute to the success rate 
of a particular paper. Eponymy is a well-known factor 
(Merton 1957/1973). If you want to become academ­
ically famous, invent a concept, a test, or identify a 
new disease to which your name may become 
attached. Although in the case of eponymy authorship 
is highly “functional”—simply a convenient way for 
referring to tests, concepts, illnesses or bodily parts— 
it works. Hardly anyone who refers to the Stroop test 
or Stroop effect nowadays, will know anything about 
the individual bearing the surname Stroop. Hardly 
anyone will really have read his publication (Stroop 
1935). Yet, his impact factor must be astounding.
The Role of the Individual in Contemporary 
Science: From Autonomy to Anonymity 
and Beyond
When it comes to defining the contribution made by 
individual scientists to progress in science, a series of 
trends can be identified. Initially, individuality was 
the focus of attention. Historians and other scholars 
studying science tended to see scientific progress as 
the achievement of a limited number of “heroes 
of science,” a mere handful of “great men.” An 
exemplification of this genre is the book Große 
Männer, published by Nobel Prize winner Wilhelm 
Ostwald in 1909. The author was an outstanding 
physical chemist who, later in life, became interested 
in the history of his field. In this book he describes 
and analyses the life stories of six prominent scientists
Ö  Springer
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of the nineteenth century, all of them male. Indeed, 
Ostwald explicitly states that, although examples of 
female researchers such as Madame Curie do exist, 
they are the exception to the rule—the rule being that, 
basically, scientific research is the work of a limited 
number of very great men.
Another interesting example is Paul de Kruif’s 
bestseller The Microbe Hunters published in 1927 and 
devoted to scientific heroes such as Louis Pasteur and 
Robert Koch—the latter received the Nobel Prize in 
1905, whereas the former died in 1895, six years before 
the Nobel Prizes began to be awarded. Paul de Kruif 
was “America’s first great science writer” (Henig
2002). Born in 1890, he was trained as a bacteriol­
ogist. He published on streptococci and worked at the 
Rockefeller Institute until he was fired after publishing 
an anonymous, critical review of contemporary medical 
research. He was co-author, but not duly acknowledged 
as such, of Sinclair Lewis’ novel Arrowsmith, published 
in 1925, about a research institute clearly modelled 
after the Rockefeller Institute. Critics sometimes 
argue that in his narratives De Kruif relied too 
much on his imagination and enthusiasm for 
science, but two successful Hollywood movies and 
one successful Broadway play were based on 
Microbe Hunters, his most famous book. De Kruif’s 
lively and readable account presents a rather sup­
portive and protagonist-oriented portrayal of scien­
tists as heroes, emphatically emphasizing the 
dramatic element inherent in experimental inquiry 
(Zwart 2004). Alfred Nobel’s will, although extremely 
concise compared to the publications by Ostwald and 
De Kruif, seems to convey a similar view on progress 
in science: it is the epoch-making work of outstanding 
individuals who, because of one decisive feat that 
actually represents a life of tenacious effort, manage to 
contribute significantly and exceptionally to human 
knowledge and wellbeing.
From the 1970s and 1980s onwards, after the 
decline of existentialism so to speak, scepticism 
concerning the role of individual heroes quickly 
began to spread. Within the domain of science studies 
(broadly defined) there has been a conscious shift 
away from studying the work of individual scientists 
towards analysing networks, discourses and structures 
(Shortland and Yeo 1996). Science was no longer seen 
as the achievement of a limited number of “great men” 
(Lenard 1933). Rather, knowledge claims were now 
regarded as being produced by networks of more or
less anonymous actors, so that any desire to focus 
on prominent individuals tended to be regarded with 
suspicion. This trend is exemplified by Bruno Latour’s 
monograph entitled “The Pasteurisation of France” 
(1984/1988), which has been referred to as a Hamlet 
without Hamlet, since the hero whose name is referred 
to in the title is virtually absent in the book (Shortland 
and Yeo 1996). Science studies seemed to proclaim 
what Michel Foucault referred to as the “death” of 
the author-as-an-individual. According to Foucault, the 
history of scientific authorship displays a definite 
shift away from grand authoritative names (such as 
“Aristotle”) as indices of genius and truth towards a 
purely functional form of authorship, where an 
author’s name predominantly serves as, for instance, 
a search item in the context of information retrieval in 
PubMed and similar sources. And insofar authorship 
has become merely functional, various reward mech­
anisms, even Nobel Prizes, may perhaps be seen as 
predominantly functional as well, as techniques 
employed in the context of performance assessment 
of research groups or universities. Moreover, a Nobel 
Prize may come to play a “political” function as well. 
Awarding the Prize to someone like James Watson 
then means that the scientific establishment in place 
actually promotes a particular interpretation of what 
the biomedical life sciences are (namely that they 
should be regarded as more or less identical with 
molecular biology), at the expense of other possible 
interpretations. And indeed, Nobel laureates such as 
Watson are very powerful figures in science, deploying 
laureate status and other achievements to assume 
pivotal roles in processes of agenda-setting, Watson 
for instance in his role as the first director of the HGP 
(as Collins’ predecessor).
Although it is important, of course, to be aware of 
the pitfalls of hero worship in science, and although 
the social and political dimensions of science (the 
structures, networks, institutions and power plays 
involved) are crucially important when it comes to 
understanding science as a real-life phenomenon, I 
believe that time has come to reconsider and re- 
acknowledge the role played by the individual in 
scientific research. If we want to understand and 
assess the dynamics of scientific progress, attention 
should be paid to the micro-level, the level of individual 
activity as well (Zwart 2008b). After focussing on 
scientists as heroes (at the expense of social context), 
and after subsequently dismissing the individual
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dimension from science studies altogether (in favour of 
a more sociological, structural or science politics 
approach), I would like to argue that it is important 
to pay due attention again to the dimension of 
individuality as well, notably when it comes to 
addressing issues of normativity. To phrase it in a 
Foucauldian manner: science must be studied not on 
the level of science politics or epistemic communities 
only, but also on the level of the Self. The individual is 
the place where transformations of knowledge produc­
tion become lively and concrete. How do individuals 
position themselves as responsible agents in the face of 
major transformations in knowledge production and 
technoscientific change?
In other words, what I advocate is not a reframing 
of science ethics in accordance with the archetypical 
image of the solitary researcher as a hero, whose 
heroism notably resides in his willingness to stub­
bornly oppose (rather than interactively endorse) the 
forces of collectivism. Quite the contrary, the emer­
gence of Big Science has irrevocably reinforced the 
shift from “researcher-driven” research, conducted by 
autonomous, more or less free-floating individuals, to 
top-down programmatic efforts involving relatively 
large numbers of (more or less anonymous) science 
workers. This basic shift, from autonomy to anonym­
ity, challenges and changes the meaning of research in 
general and of scientific authorship in particular, but 
does not erase the dimension of the individual Self 
altogether. To further elaborate this issue, I will build 
on a line of thinking that is often somewhat neglected 
in mainstream science ethics, namely the type of 
thinking about research and normativity exemplified 
by authors such as Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and 
Sloterdijk. Nietzsche, for instance, whose talent for 
anticipation can hardly be questioned, already dis­
cerned that normal modern science is bound to entail 
the replacement of exceptional heroes by armies of 
anonymous individuals (1980, § 547). According to 
Nietzsche, however, a true scientist will endorse 
rather than deplore this anonymity as inevitable. For 
Nietzsche, a true scientist is not only someone who is 
willing to put his theories to the test, remaining 
susceptible to criticism, continuously on the alert not 
to deceive himself; for Nietzsche, the most important 
scientific virtue of all is self-denial. He sums this up 
in the simple phrase Was liegt an mir! It is not me that 
counts! For Nietzsche, this phrase articulates the core 
of the scientific ethos, the quintessence of being “in
science” (1980, § 547). His view was taken up many 
years later by Michel Foucault who articulated his 
own version of the same idea: “Qu’importe qui 
parle?” For Foucault, the most fundamental ethical 
principle of contemporary scientific discourse resides 
in a basic indifference towards the issue of authorship 
(1994, 789; Cf. Zwart 2001). Science is, first and 
foremost, a discursive phenomenon in which author 
names serve as functional tools, notably in the context 
of information retrieval as we have seen. In normal 
science, academic authorship comes very close to 
anonymity, and there is a certain moral quality in the 
stoical acceptance of this fact. And indeed, it is in this 
vein that many Nobel laureates have written in 
retrospect about their Prize. J. Michael Bishop’s 
How to win the Nobel Prize may serve as an example 
here, conveying a basic attitude of unobtrusiveness, 
for instance in the following sentences inserted right 
at the beginning of his account: “I felt less than fully 
deserving, because the discovery for which Harold 
[Varmus] and I were being honored was only in modest 
part of my own making...” etc. (Bishop 2003, 3).
Yet, this does not delete the dimension of individ­
uality altogether—far from it. Rather, self-denial or 
unobtrusiveness are particular styles or modes for 
positioning oneself as a scientific individual. Following 
Nietzsche’s lead in this, Foucault (1984, 1994), 
Sloterdijk (2010) and others have argued (as Nietzsche 
already did in more or less similar terms) that scientific 
research may be regarded as a kind of “practice of the 
Self”, a form of moral self-edification for the individ­
uals involved. Through training and intellectual ascet­
icism, scientists gradually transform themselves, not 
only into highly reliable sources of information, but 
also into pioneers who, in the folds and margins of 
established discourse, are able to enter new terrains, to 
experiment with new techniques and thus to open up 
novel perspectives. Moreover, these authors emphasise 
that, although the conditions for scientific research and 
academic authorship have clearly changed, the axis of 
the Self continues to constitute a pivotal dimension of 
discourse production.
In other words, besides self-denial (i.e. the gener­
ous affirmation by scientists of their anonymity and 
fundamental dependence on others), there is another 
side to seeing scientific research as a “practice of the 
Self”, namely the inherent strive towards self­
improvement, the basic will to challenge established 
conventions and the readiness to face new dawns.
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This means that in science, individual excellence is 
achieved by those who, through constant training and 
permanent re-education, remain eager and willing to 
acquire new vocabularies and skills. Those who see 
novel fields as test-beds and experimental settings, 
not only in the scientific sense, but also for exploring 
new dilemmas and trying out new ways of addressing 
normative issues. And this notably applies to science 
workers in the current era. Besides the willingness to 
learn to use new tools, such as ICT equipment or new 
computational techniques, it also implies the willing­
ness to become adept in novel practices and fluent in 
novel professional vocabularies.
Important challenges facing scientific individuals 
in the Big Science era notably emerge in areas of 
management and communication. They must acquire 
the skills not only for governance of the Self, in order 
to establish themselves as a reliable and meticulous 
individual, as was already the case in the era of the 
lone scientific individual, but also for the governance 
of increasing numbers of academic others. Whereas 
traditionally science ethics tended to focus on the 
dilemmas of autonomous decision-making processes 
by researchers as individuals (micro-ethics), the new era 
of Big Science calls for an ethic that addresses social 
and political dimensions as well (macro-ethics). This 
involves important moral values such as responsibility, 
procedural fairness and transparency. Subsequently, one 
could argue that, in order to remain in line with these 
developments, the Nobel Prize will gradually have to 
evolve into a mechanism of acknowledgement for 
novel types of excellence, namely the excellence of 
scientists who, at a certain point in their career, 
successfully transform themselves from outstanding 
individual researchers into visible, accountable and 
communicative research managers. The question then 
remains whether those to whom this applies deserve 
to be singled out and credited, while the great 
majority of their devoted colleagues are bound to 
remain anonymous? Does the desire for individual 
acknowledgement still make sense?
Desire for Acknowledgement
In the movie Casablanca there is a famous and 
intriguing scene. At a certain point, a hero enters the 
room. Humphrey Bogart, albeit with a slightly cynical 
undertone in his voice, complements him with his
achievements. The hero, assuming a quasi-humble 
posture, replies by saying that he simply tries to make 
a contribution, like so many other people do. Humphrey 
Bogart then retorts with one of his most famous 
one-liners: “We all try, but some succeed.” Although 
many individuals are more or less committed, some 
individuals happen to make a contribution that is more 
decisive than those of others.
In various publications and seminars the French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan argued that, rather than 
money, survival, sexual gratification or big automo­
biles, acknowledgement is what we are really after. 
Acknowledgement is our basic desire, fuelling crea­
tivity and perseverance, even under hazardous con­
ditions, and science continues to rely on individuals 
who are willing to display this type of behaviour. 
Mechanisms of acknowledgement are important ele­
ments in what Lacan refers to as the “symbolic order.” 
Symbolic rewards facilitate and consolidate profes­
sional collaboration. In psychoanalysis, the traditional 
Freudian idea had been that research is a kind of 
“sublimation.” In the face of societal constraints, 
individuals at a certain point decide to invest their 
libido in activities other than sex and reproduction. 
For Freud, however, research remains a detour for 
individuals on their way to sexual intercourse and 
parenthood, their ultimate destination. Lacan has 
reframed this somewhat differently. A high citation 
index is an important gratification, a rewarding source 
of pleasure in itself. One of the pitfalls for scholars is 
what Lacan would refer to as “imaginary” recogni­
tion: acknowledgement by a limited number of close 
followers or friends nearby; the kind of recognition 
that typifies sectarism. That is why anonymity, 
globalisation and quantification are so important 
when it comes to defining performance indicators. It 
means that we are no longer dependent on the fragile 
benevolence (usually based on reciprocity rather than 
true merit) of those individuals who happen to 
constitute our immediate academic Umwelt. Thus, 
recognition is the symbolic bread we as researchers 
and scholars live by, and this implies that the Nobel 
Prize, rather than having become a ritual devoid of 
meaning or a relic from the past, still has to be 
taken quite seriously as an acme of symbolic 
acknowledgement.
Yet, building on what has been argued above, time 
has come to reconsider our basic mechanisms of 
acknowledgement in order to determine whether they
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still do justice to the way in which top scientists 
nowadays have to function. Every now and then it is 
important to update and, if necessary, adjust our ways 
of operationalizing and valuing excellence. Big 
Science has incited the emergence of new roles. 
Typical lab sites are not the only places where 
creativity becomes decisive and grand ideas flash 
up. This may also happen at airports and international 
conferences, or during board meetings and committee 
gatherings. The “big names” in contemporary life 
sciences, the pioneers and agenda-setters, the “first 
authors” of landmark publications, are often heavily 
involved in acquiring large-scale funding and in 
management of science. The role of the scientific 
research manager has become a pivotal one, not only 
in terms of making discoveries and discerning their 
importance, but also in assessing and addressing the 
complex ethical, political and strategic issues emerg­
ing in contemporary research. Besides a track record 
in laboratory research, scientists in positions of 
authority must develop new moral virtues besides 
the traditional ones connected with bench work, such 
as meticulousness, trustworthiness and selflessness. It 
is their challenge to become the visionaries of 
contemporary science: articulating “thick” views on 
what is happening in current research and what this 
may imply for our understanding of ourselves and 
nature, as well as for societies of the future; developing 
seismographic sensitivities towards important trends 
and promising developments. They are also the ones in 
a position to ensure that, as Alfred Nobel once stated it, 
expensive, large-scale research endeavours contribute 
sufficiently to the benefit of mankind. In short, science 
in the Big Science era has become an activity that is 
more complicated even than playing simultaneous 
chess. It might be compared to playing a variety of 
different games on different boards simultaneously, with 
each game having its own standards of excellence, its 
own morale. Is has become impossible to assess 
scientific performance (or excellence, as the current 
jargon calls it) on the basis of a single coherent set of 
criteria. This heterogeneity was already present in 
Nobel’s will, where both academic excellence and 
societal relevance were regarded as important. Nobel 
Prize winners of the present and near future are bound to 
excel on an even broader spectrum. They will have to be 
virtuosi of heterogeneity, able to perform outstandingly 
in a broad range of complex and controversial settings.
Does the HGP Merit a Nobel Prize?
Let me now apply these considerations to the case 
study at hand, the HGP. It is a complicated “file” no 
doubt, but also a timely one, given the fact that, “ten 
years after” its completion, the subdued debate is now 
bound to become “acute” once again. In his one-page 
testament, Alfred Nobel stipulated that the funds 
involved should go to outstanding research achieve­
ments (“the most important discovery within the 
domain of physiology or medicine”) which during 
the preceding year had conferred the greatest benefit 
on mankind. However, the criterion of promptitude 
explicitly mentioned in the bequest (“during the 
preceding year”) has been dropped. As a rule, the 
Prize is nowadays given to a contribution made 
something like a decade before. By this time, the 
significance of the contribution has become suffi­
ciently clear. Thus, 2010 would be an opportune year 
for a HGP Nobel Prize to be awarded.
Moreover, as was argued above, the HGP exem­
plifies the emergence of Big Science in the life 
sciences, with all the ingredients this involves, 
ranging from high visibility and lofty societal expect­
ations up to multiple authorship and the intricacies of 
private-public funding. Thus, the HGP seems to 
constitute a perfect “test case” for the Nobel Prize as 
a mechanism of acknowledgment in the era of “big” 
life science. Still, if the Nobel Prize committee should 
want to reward the HGP with a Nobel Prize, in view 
of its scientific and societal significance, how are they 
to identify the one, two, or three individuals who 
deserve to be singled out, who may be credited for 
this achievement?
The first stipulation to consider, no doubt, is 
whether the HGP has produced significant benefit 
for humankind. From the very outset, the HGP has 
been presented as a milestone in the history of both 
science and humanity. While the project in its early 
days was often compared to landing on the moon, the 
societal prospects it opened up were fleshed out in an 
increasingly detailed manner as the project continued 
to evolve. As Collins told CNN during a famous 
interview, it is hard to overstate the importance of 
reading “our own instruction book.” Yet, countless 
critics have argued that the societal “relevance” of the 
HGP is far from clear as yet. Although genomics has 
produced an avalanche of bioinformation, concrete
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social benefits are still sparse compared to the grand 
promises that have been made at various occasions, 
such as the claim uttered during the HGP Press 
Conference (June 26 2000) that “it is now conceiv­
able that our children’s children will know the term 
cancer only as a constellation of stars” (http://www. 
genome.gov/10001356). Let us, however, for the sake 
of the argument, give the HGP the benefit of the 
doubt in this respect, so that we may focus on the key 
issue of this article: the extent to which scientific 
achievement in the contemporary biosciences, such 
as the HGP, can still be meaningfully attributed to 
individuals, even if, as was already indicated above, 
Nobel Prizes in Physiology or Medicine are now 
typically given to three researchers rather than one. I 
will argue that, for a number of reasons, a “HGP 
Nobel Prize” (in 2010 or so) would still make sense. 
But how to select an acceptable and credible set of 
candidates?
One source of information concerning track record 
and “practices of the Self” of outstanding scientists 
are biographies and autobiographies, notably the 
latter. In recent years, a stream of autobiographical 
accounts has been published concerning the history of 
the human genome sequencing effort, such as Collins 
(2006), Crick (1988), Hood (2002), Sanger (1988), 
Shreeve (2004), Sulston and Ferry (2002/2003), 
Venter (2007) and Watson (2000), but the list will 
no doubt continue to expand. These are, if anything, 
moral documents, devoted to self-assessment, self­
criticism and self-justification. In virtually all of them, 
for instance, issues of agency and responsibility are 
explicitly addressed. To what extent can individuals 
really be seen as authors of their scientific lives, as 
autonomous decision-makers? Rather than presenting 
themselves as heroes of science, in full control of the 
events, even highly visible scientists such as Sulston, 
Collins and Venter emphasize (albeit in terms of their 
own personal vocabularies) how they see themselves 
as team workers, as products even, rather than as 
initiators—describing in a lively manner how they, 
notably at crucial moments, had the experience of 
being “pulled”, “swept” or “driven” by events, the 
outcomes of which were often impossible to predict 
from an individual perspective. Their autobiographies 
describe complex processes of interaction, involving 
both intricate social dynamics and individual initia­
tives, and we cannot say that primacy is given to the
latter. The grand efforts these authors were officially 
heading are described in terms of unpredictability, 
uncontrollability—sheer chaos even—rather than as 
exemplifications of top-down, management-driven 
“planning and control.” Moreover, after reading the 
reminiscences of Sulston, Collins and Venter one is 
bound to realize that, although their role was important, 
it was limited as well. After reading Venter’s autobiog­
raphy, for instance, in combination with Shreeve’s 
history (2004) of the companies (TIGR and Celera) 
he headed, it is clear that in various respects, 
researchers like Gene Myers, Mark Adams or Hamilton 
Smith were at least as important in terms of decisive 
scientific contributions as was Venter himself. Thus, 
eventually, individual contributions must become con- 
textualized again in a more comprehensive view of 
science as team or network work.
Still, I want to argue that, eventually—notwith- 
standing the astonishing scale and complexity of 
contemporary research efforts, notably in the life- 
sciences—individuals can make a difference at times 
(notably at crucial moments), and that these decisive 
contributions are meaningfully attributable as well. 
When Francis Collins was appointed Director of the 
HGP in 1993, he already had an impressive track 
record as a “gene hunter.” He had made a name for 
himself by developing gene-finding methods such as 
positional cloning and chromosome jumping, and by 
discovering the location of three important disease 
genes, namely those responsible for cystic fibrosis, 
neurofibromatosis and Huntington’s disease (Collins 
et al. 1987). Thus, assessed in terms of more or less 
traditional criteria, focusing on single individuals as 
researchers, a nomination for the Nobel Prize would 
already make sense. Yet, in subsequent stages of his 
career, he was willing and able to develop comple­
mentary skills as well, and to excel in other fields. 
After successfully taking the lead in the human 
genome venture, he was recently appointed as 
director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
an acknowledgement of his managerial perfor­
mance. Moreover, he presented series of lectures 
on the societal aspects of genomics and significantly 
contributed to debates on this issue through interviews 
and panel discussions. Thus, besides academic 
research papers, he also published or co-authored a 
number of influential papers on the prospects of 
genomics for society (Collins 1999)—the famous
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“benefits for mankind” to which Alfred Nobel’s 
will refers.
Or take the case of Craig J. Venter. Much earlier 
than most of his competitors, he acknowledged and 
understood the importance of automated sequencing 
and some of the specific methodologies involved in 
this, such as the EST (Expressed Sequence Tags) 
technique he invented, in combination with the 
notorious whole-genome “shotgun” approach. The 
string of genome publications in the 1990s in which 
he was highly involved, such as the ones on the EST 
technique (Adams et al. 1991) and on the Drosophila 
genome sequence (Adams et al. 2000) made him one 
of the most highly cited researchers, while the 
comparatively small teams he marshaled produced 
staggering amounts of bioinformation. And his 
publication on the human genome (Venter et al. 
2001) was not the end of his career. Rather, he 
subsequently set sail in order to sequence the 
metagenome of oceanic life forms. As Kevin Davies 
(2002) argues, although Venter’s restless ambition and 
single-minded opportunism have alienated him from 
many of his fellow scientists, his trailblazing accom­
plishments in DNA sequencing over the past decade 
justify a Nobel Prize. Besides that, he was a pioneer 
in other fields as well, developing new approaches in 
science management through private-public partner­
ships and valorization. His well-documented experi­
ences in this realm provide ample material for 
reflection, also on the risks and pitfalls involved in 
introducing such strategies in science. And finally, 
like Collins, though lectures, interviews and, eventually, 
his autobiography, he contributed significantly to 
current debates on the societal meaning of genomics 
and the HGP and on the implications it has had for our 
understanding of ourselves as well as of life on earth. Of 
course, he did not do all this single-handedly—he had 
an eye for recruiting talent as well as for acquiring 
substantial funding. But when it comes to assessing the 
HGP, the sometimes-decisive interventions and contri­
butions of individuals such as Collins and Venter are 
impossible to ignore.
If we adopt this line of reasoning, however, the 
focus is bound to shift from one particular and 
definite contribution (“discovery”) to an extended 
performance, turning the Nobel Prize into a “lifetime 
award.” The Nobel Prize would then be granted not 
on the basis of an assessment of a single discovery or 
publication, but rather on the basis of a track record, a
whole career, a curriculum vitae that not only involves 
laboratory achievements (technoscientific genius), but 
managerial and communicational talents and achieve­
ments as well. The problem then remains whether it is 
fair and meaningful to single out individuals (rather 
than, for instance, institutes or teams) in a time of mass 
production of knowledge claims. Before World War II 
the Nobel Prize had almost always been awarded to a 
single individual. In the more recent past, it has become 
standard practice to select three laureates a year. This 
already indicates that, as a reward mechanism, the 
Nobel Prize acknowledges and reflects the increase of 
scale that has taken place in science. Yet, in my view, to 
further expand this trend—for instance, by singling out 
teams, consortia or institutes rather than individuals 
as possible laureates—would be deplorable as a 
symptom of anonymisation. As individual effort con­
tinues to be a crucial element in the dynamics of science, 
the acknowledgement of individual achievements 
remains important as well. As was argued above, the 
Nobel Prize is one element (a highly prestigious and 
visible element no doubt) in a complex network of 
symbolic “mechanisms of acknowledgement.” As the 
complexities of the knowledge production process 
continue to increase, the mechanisms involved must 
no doubt become more adaptive, differentiated and 
sophisticated as well in order to remain meaningful 
and effective. This does not imply, however, that 
acknowledgement of individual achievement as such 
is something of the past. Nobel committees of the 
future face a difficult and complicated task. Nonetheless, 
achievements deserve to be acknowledged, and some 
achievements more than others.
If we agree that the human genome sequence effort 
still merits an “individual” Nobel Prize, who should 
be the laureates? As other candidates such as James 
Watson, John Sulston and Hamilton Smith will have 
to be dismissed, simply because they have already 
been awarded the Nobel Prize for Physiology or 
Medicine (and scientists can become a “Physiology or 
Medicine” laureate only once in a lifetime), the idea 
of a Nobel Prize for Collins and Venter—preferably in 
2010—appears a plausible one, on the basis of their 
measurable and quantifiable performance. A Nobel 
Prize for Collins and Venter would underline that 
over and above being excellent researchers earlier in 
their careers, these individuals became outstanding 
research managers somewhat later in their lives. And 
these management responsibilities involved not only
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scientific and managerial skills, but also the ability to 
address the complex societal issues involved and to 
effectively deliberate these issues with policy makers, 
politicians, entrepreneurs, journalists and the public at 
large. Moreover, to the extent that individuals such 
as Collins and Venter are acknowledged for their 
exceptional merits as research managers, their Nobel 
Prizes will be indirectly awarded to the teams they 
represent, thereby acknowledging the less visible 
geniuses whom they recruited to work behind the 
scenes.
When it comes to awarding the Nobel Prize to 
Collins and/or Venter, another hazardous issue will 
be to what extent modes of funding should be taken 
into consideration. Officially, while Collins headed 
the publicly funded sequencing effort, Venter led a 
privately owned company with a stock market quota­
tion. As the history of the Nobel Prize reflects the idea 
that academic excellence in combination with working 
for the benefit of society is somehow incompatible 
with striving for personal financial gain, this would 
considerably compromise Venter’s chances. Yet, also 
in this respect, it has become increasingly difficult 
to interpret the world in terms of convenient moral 
dichotomies. Contemporary funding policies for aca­
demic research increasingly rely on the emergence of 
private-public consortia. Not only the funding strate­
gies, but also the work ethic and the reward systems of 
universities and knowledge enterprises have begun to 
merge. Even publicly funded research efforts have 
become both costly and potentially profitable endeav­
ours. And while Venter at various occasions published 
staggering amount of genomics data for free, Watson, 
Collins and most of the other protagonists of publicly 
funded genomics research privately own patents. Thus, 
it will become an increasingly intricate matter to 
determine where to convincingly draw the moral line. 
Thus, notwithstanding the various complications and 
considerations at stake, a Nobel Prize for individuals 
such as Collins and Venter would do justice to the way 
in which excellent research in the contemporary life- 
sciences is done. Eric Lander, first author of the official 
Nature presentation of our genome sequence, would 
be a convincing “third” candidate to join them.
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